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ABSTRACT: The Hague Conference on Private International Law currently has a 
Parentage/Surrogacy Project, which evaluates the legal status of children in cross-border 
situations, including situations involving international contract pregnancy (or 
‘surrogacy’). Should a convention (or other legal instrument) focusing on international 
contract pregnancy emerge from this project, it will need to be consistent with the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption. The latter convention prohibits adoptions unless, 
among other things, “the competent authorities of the receiving State have determined 
that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to adopt” (Article 5a). 
Included in it, therefore, is a parental vetting or licensing requirement. In our view, a 
similar requirement must also appear in any Hague Convention on international contract 
pregnancy if the two conventions are to be ethically consistent with one another. In 
particular, there should be a licensing requirement in such a convention for at least some 
of the prospective parents in contract pregnancy arrangements. We consider several 
arguments against this conclusion, and argue that none of them is successful.  
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I. Introduction 
The issue of whether people should be licensed to become parents—the issue, that is, of 
whether the state should restrict the ability of individuals to become parents unless or 
until they reveal some competency to be a parent—has generated significant 
controversy.1 Currently, some parents are licensed: namely, adoptive parents.2 They have 
to undergo a home study and, sometimes, mandatory parenting classes before adopting a 
child. While some philosophers (e.g., Hugh LaFollette) contend that such requirements 
should exist for all parents, we have argued for a more nuanced position: that so long as 
such requirements are imposed on adoptive parents, they should be imposed on all or 
some subset of non-adoptive parents as well.3 In other words, we have claimed that what 
we call the “status quo on parental licensing”—according to which licensing should 
occur with adoption (more specifically, with non-relative, non-step-parent adoption),4 but 
not with biological reproduction—is morally unjustified.  
The issue of whether licensing should occur for a larger subset of parents than 
just adoptive parents is relevant to current debates about international law and policy on 
international contract pregnancy (or ‘surrogacy’, as it is often called). The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (the Hague Conference) has recently decided to 
convene an Experts’ Group to explore the feasibility of continuing work on its 
Parentage/Surrogacy Project, which concerns the legal status of children in cross-border 
situations, including international contract pregnancy arrangements.5 Although this group 
is merely a working group—there is no commitment on the part of the Hague Conference 
at this time to develop a convention on international contract pregnancy—it will 
nonetheless need to consider the extent to which any such convention should be informed 
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by the Hague Conference’s Convention on Adoption (i.e., the 1993 Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption).6 The 
latter convention includes a parental licensing requirement: Article 5a states that “[a]n 
adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent 
authorities of the receiving State have determined that the prospective adoptive parents 
are eligible and suited to adopt.” Some commentators feel that a similar article—
concerning the parental fitness of people who want to become parents through contract 
pregnancy7—should appear in any Convention on this practice,8 while others strongly 
disagree.9 We argue in this paper that the Hague Conference cannot consistently demand 
parental licensing for adoption but not for contract pregnancy, or at least not for some 
people who wish to become parents through this practice. In other words, so long as it 
has Article 5a in its Convention on Adoption, it ought to have an article on licensing in 
any convention that it develops on contract pregnancy.  
It is an open question to what degree the two conventions would have to be 
similar for them to be ethically consistent with one another. We distinguish between a 
weak and a strong version of the claim that there should be licensing for individuals who 
engage in contract pregnancy so long as there is licensing for individuals who seek to 
adopt children. The strong version of the claim holds that all individuals who pursue 
contract pregnancy should be licensed, while the weak version holds only that some of 
these individuals—namely, those who will not be genetically related to any resulting 
child—should be licensed. Although we argue here only in support of the weak claim, 
our arguments leave open the possibility that the strong claim may be true nonetheless 
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(and moreover, arguments we have made elsewhere suggest that this claim is indeed 
true).  
In what follows, we present a number of arguments that people have given or 
could give for the conclusion that while parental licensing is appropriate in the case of 
adoption, it is never appropriate in the case of contract pregnancy. Either directly or 
indirectly, these arguments support the status quo on parental licensing, which again 
involves no licensing for people who engage in (assisted or unassisted) reproduction. We 
explain why each of these arguments fails. In so doing, we draw on our previous work on 
parental licensing, but also extend the scope of that work by claiming that arguments in 
favour of the status quo are especially weak when applied to people who seek to become 
parents through contract pregnancy. 
Reasons given against the imposition of a licensing requirement on people who 
pursue contract pregnancy sometimes focus on the fact that this practice involves 
biological reproduction. We begin with such arguments and then turn to those that have 
nothing to do with reproduction.  
 
2. Arguments that Concern Biological Reproduction 
“Surrogacy belongs to the world of reproduction rather than adoption”, according to 
Natalie Gamble, a solicitor in the UK whose firm specializes in “fertility and parenting 
law” and helps clients become parents through contract pregnancy.10 In a recent article, 
Gamble insists that the prior vetting of people who wish to become parents in this 
manner is inappropriate.11 Among her reasons are the following: that such a requirement 
would be unfair, given that people who are fertile and who reproduce do not have to 
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“jump through hoops” to become parents12; that it would be “an interference with 
parents’ right to procreate”13; and that “parents conceiving through surrogacy are no 
more likely to be unsuitable than fertile parents”—they are no more likely, in other 
words, to harm children—and so vetting is unnecessary in their case.14 We call these 
arguments the Fairness Argument, the Right to Reproduce Argument, and the Harm to 
Children Argument, respectively, and we evaluate each in turn. Along the way—and in 
particular when discussing the Right to Reproduce Argument—we question Gamble’s 
suggestion that with contract pregnancy, members of the commissioning couple always 
reproduce, rather than simply initiate reproduction. (And to be clear, we interpret 
‘biological reproduction’ broadly such that it occurs whenever one acquires a biological 
connection to a child produced through genetics, gestation, or both.) Contract pregnancy 
is indeed a form of assisted reproduction, but the people who reproduce through it are not 
always those who commission the pregnancy.  
 
 (i) The Fairness Argument 
Let us begin with the Fairness Argument. It aims to show that it would be unfair to 
license people who pursue contract pregnancy specifically, or who use assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs) more generally, because people who reproduce 
through sexual intercourse are not subject to such interference by the state. The main 
purpose of this argument is therefore not to endorse the status quo on parental licensing, 
but rather to reject on grounds of fairness the suggestion that licensing should occur with 
any form of assisted reproduction. Nonetheless, the argument supports the status quo 
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indirectly, because it fails to question whether licensing for adoption is itself 
inappropriate or possibly unfair.  
The Fairness Argument emphasizes similarities between assisted and unassisted 
reproduction and concludes that, because vetting is not required in the case of the latter, 
it should not be required in the case of the former either. But this argument overlooks the 
obvious fact that in addition to being similar to unassisted reproduction, assisted 
reproduction is also similar in other respects to adoption and may be similar to it in ways 
that are relevant to whether licensing should occur. For example, with both assisted 
reproduction and adoption, one becomes a parent only with assistance from others, which 
makes licensing more feasible than it is with unassisted reproduction15: licensing can be a 
condition on receiving the appropriate assistance, whereas it is hardly feasible to make it 
a condition on having unprotected sexual intercourse. The similarity with regards to 
feasibility is relevant to whether licensing should occur if, in practice, parents can only 
be licensed when it is feasible to do so. Thus, in light of such a similarity between 
assisted reproduction and adoption, one could argue that there should be licensing with 
both practices, or that so long as the status quo—and more importantly in the present 
context, the Hague Convention on Adoption—requires parental licensing for adoption, a 
similar requirement should exist for assisted reproduction and should appear in any 
Hague Convention on contract pregnancy.    
The main problem, then, with the Fairness Argument is that it begs the question, 
“Why, when it comes to assessing whether parental licensing is warranted, is assisted 
reproduction taken to be relevantly similar to unassisted reproduction but relevantly 
dissimilar to adoption?” This question is crucial given that in certain respects, assisted 
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reproduction can be more similar to adoption than to unassisted reproduction; and if that 
is true, then licensing those who want to become parents through adoption or assisted 
reproduction may be justified.16  
To see how contract pregnancy, in particular, resembles or can resemble 
adoption, consider the fact that contract pregnancy often involves the use of donor 
gametes. In many cases, one set of gametes is donated (usually oocytes17) and in some 
cases, both sets are donated. With the former type of case, only one prospective parent 
will be biologically related to any resulting child, while with the latter type, neither 
prospective parent will have this sort of connection to the child. Both of these types of 
contract pregnancy are like adoption then, in that they involve people becoming parents 
to children to whom they have no biological tie. But according to one argument in 
support of the status quo on parental licensing, the absence of such a tie is precisely what 
justifies licensing in the case of adoption. (See the Harm to Children Argument I below.) 
Thus, in some instances, contract pregnancy resembles adoption in a way that might 
make parental licensing appropriate in both cases.   
Of course, contract pregnancy can also resemble unassisted reproduction in ways 
that may be relevant to licensing. For example, one might think that with contract 
pregnancy, as with unassisted (or other forms of assisted) reproduction, prospective 
parents exercise a right to reproduce, and that it is impermissible for the state to interfere 
unduly with the exercise of this right. Or one might think that with no form of 
reproduction—not even contract pregnancy—does parental responsibility get transferred 
between parties (i.e., between birth parents or guardians and soon-to-be social parents), 
and so there is nothing for the state to oversee or regulate. Below, we consider these 
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possibilities, among others, for how contract pregnancy might be relevantly similar to 
unassisted or other forms of reproduction, but dissimilar to adoption. Our claim in each 
case is that either the purported dissimilarities to adoption are merely apparent or they are 
not relevant to whether the prospective parents should be licensed. These conclusions are 
significant for the Fairness Argument because they show that one cannot simply put 
assisted and unassisted reproduction together in a separate category from adoption when 
determining whether parental licensing is justified.  
To be clear, we are not arguing that because some contract pregnancies are 
similar to adoptions, we should treat all contract pregnancies like adoptions. The point is 
rather that an uncritical appeal to the concept of fairness cannot establish that parental 
licensing is always inappropriate in the case of contract pregnancy. At best, the Fairness 
Argument, as it is applied to contract pregnancy, is inconclusive. It neglects to show 
why, given that people who reproduce via sexual intercourse are unlicensed, it would be 
unfair to license people who use ARTs, but fair to continue licensing people who choose 
to adopt children. The explanation cannot simply be that only the first two ways of 
becoming a parent—via sexual intercourse or through the use of ARTs—involve 
biological reproduction, since the mere fact that someone reproduces cannot determine 
whether that individual should be licensed. Thus, for all that the Fairness Argument says, 
fairness might demand that parental vetting be a requirement with contract pregnancy 
and be included in any convention governing this practice.  
Note, finally, that one could respond to the Fairness Argument by insisting that 
adoptive parents should not be licensed either. Such a response might indeed be 
legitimate (although we have our doubts).18 Yet if the intent of the Hague Conference is 
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to fashion a convention on contract pregnancy that is ethically consistent with the 
Convention on Adoption—a document that already requires the licensing of prospective 
adoptive parents—then the two conventions must treat relevantly similar prospective 
parents in similar ways. And in our opinion, this involves requiring that at least some 
people who pursue parenthood through contract pregnancy be vetted, just as individuals 
who choose adoption are vetted.  
 
(ii) The Right to Reproduce Argument 
Thus, the Fairness Argument does not provide compelling reasons for likening contract 
pregnancy, or other forms of assisted reproduction, to unassisted reproduction rather than 
to adoption in debates about parental licensing. But are there reasons for thinking that the 
relevant comparison should be to unassisted reproduction rather than to adoption? In 
other words, should one accept that the status quo on parental licensing is justified? One 
important argument in support of this state of affairs, which we mentioned above in 
passing, relies on the so-called “right to reproduce”. According to this argument, whereas 
licensing would violate the right to reproduce of prospective biological parents, it 
violates no such right in the case of prospective adoptive parents, given that the latter 
clearly do not exercise a right to reproduce when becoming parents.19 This difference 
could explain why it makes sense to treat people who use ARTs in the same way as other 
individuals who reproduce without assistance, and to distinguish them from people who 
pursue adoption. On this view, licensing members of the former group is inappropriate 
because it interferes with their right to reproduce.  
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 In previous work, we have questioned whether people do in fact have a moral 
right to reproduce. Here, we discuss some of our skepticism with respect to this right, but 
also contend that one need not doubt the existence of such a right in order to defeat the 
Right to Reproduce Argument as it applies to contract pregnancy. The reason is that 
some prospective parents in contract pregnancies could not be exercising a right to 
reproduce. And if that is true, then even if this right could explain why individuals who 
engage in unassisted reproduction should be exempt from parental licensing, it could not 
explain why all individuals who pursue contract pregnancy should be similarly exempt.   
To spell out our view in more detail, note that prospective parents who will not be 
biologically related to any child born through contract pregnancy do not reproduce 
biologically through this practice. These are individuals whose gametes are not used in 
conceiving the pregnancy and who therefore will have no genetic connection to any 
resulting child. (And of course, neither prospective parent will have a gestational 
connection either.) It follows that not all individuals who seek to become parents through 
contract pregnancy exercise a right to reproduce in doing so. When people use ARTs to 
create children to whom they have no biological connection—not even a biological 
connection established during pregnancy—they themselves do not reproduce. It will not 
do to say that without their contributions, a new life would not be created, and thus, that 
they themselves are reproducing. For the same can be said about the contributions of IVF 
clinicians, and surely they do not reproduce when they perform IVF successfully. There 
is therefore a gap between playing an essential role in biological reproduction and 
exercising a right to reproduce.20 Since many individuals who commission pregnancies 
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from women do the former but not the latter, a right to reproduce could not protect them 
from being vetted as prospective parents.  
Granted, some people who have children via contract pregnancy do reproduce: 
namely, those whose gametes are used in the creation of these children. Surely a right to 
reproduce would preclude them from being licensed as parents. Or would it? In a 
previous paper on the right to reproduce and parental licensing, we question whether this 
right could protect people who, in fact, reproduce from having to undergo parental 
licensing, given that it is not clear the right even exists.21 In that paper, we distinguish 
between a right to reproduce and a right to become a parent.22 And we indicate that while 
the reasons people can have for wanting to become a parent can be very good,23 the same 
is not true of the reasons people typically give for wanting to become a biological parent, 
especially a genetic parent (i.e., the only kind of biological parent that one could become 
by commissioning a pregnancy). Various critiques exist in the literature of the desire to 
be genetically linked to one’s children.24 Due to limitations of space, we can only 
summarize these arguments here (and, therefore, will not make strong conclusions based 
on them).25 In brief, they suggest that this desire is often based on a view of genetics that 
is naïve (e.g., that family resemblances are primarily genetic) or that exaggerates the 
importance of genetic similarities among family members; on a problematic conception 
of the parent-child relationship (i.e., that a child is not truly one’s own unless one is 
genetically related to him or her); or on false beliefs about adoption (e.g., that people 
tend not to love adopted children as much as they do their “own” children). Views of this 
sort find no support within the science of genetics,26 moral analyses of the parent-child 
relationship, or empirical evidence about adoption and adopted children. They therefore 
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should be rejected. However, without them, a right to reproduce—understood here as a 
right to have genetic children27—has very little basis to it.28 We are therefore skeptical of 
this right and doubt that it could justify unfettered access to contract pregnancy for 
people who seek to become genetic parents through this practice.  
Our view, then, is that the Right to Reproduce Argument, as it is applied to 
contract pregnancy, suffers from two weaknesses. First, it assumes that individuals who 
choose to become parents through contract pregnancy reproduce, which is not universally 
true. Second, it is only successful if the reproductive element of this practice is morally 
relevant to whether people who pursue it as a means to become a parent should undergo 
parental licensing. But such a claim is doubtful, in our opinion. What is more likely 
relevant is that these people, like prospective adoptive parents, simply want to become 
parents (and are exercising a putative right to do so). In short, we think the prospects are 
dim for any attempts to argue that a right to reproduce can justify licensing for 
prospective adoptive parents but not for people who want to become parents via contract 
pregnancy.  
Still, we recognize that we have not shown fully here why a right to reproduce 
could not be a barrier to licensing for people who in fact reproduce through contract 
pregnancy. Thus, one might be left thinking that these people should not be licensed on 
the grounds that they are exercising such a right. Moreover, one might go further and 
insist that their partners should not be licensed either, even when their partners will have 
no genetic relation to any resulting child. One could argue that such cases resemble 
stepparent adoption—where the prospective non-biological parent will be parenting with 
a biological parent—and most jurisdictions do not require stepparents to go through the 
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rigours of a normal adoption to adopt their children. To respond to this objection, notice 
that this element of the status quo finds no support in the argument we are now 
considering, according to which the licensing of adoptive parents is appropriate because 
they do not exercise a right to reproduce. It follows from this argument that licensing 
should occur with stepparent adoptions—for after all, stepparents do not exercise a right 
to reproduce either when they seek to become parents of their partner’s biological child. 
Thus, proponents of the Right to Reproduce Argument cannot appeal to the status quo to 
establish that where only one member of a commissioning couple reproduces through 
contract pregnancy, both members should be spared the trials of licensing.  
To conclude this section, we have argued that the Right to Reproduce Argument 
cannot protect people from licensing who do not reproduce through contract pregnancy. 
Even more, the argument supports the inclusion of a licensing requirement for these 
individuals in any Hague convention on contract pregnancy. Consequently, our weak 
claim—that so long as adopted parents are licensed, some individuals who pursue 
contract pregnancy should also be licensed—is bolstered by this argument. But perhaps a 
different argument, one that focuses on the risk of harm to children, would lead to a 
different conclusion.  
 
 (iii) The Harm to Children Argument I 
All children, whether adopted or not, are at risk of being harmed by bad parenting. This 
much is clear. But some assume that adopted children are at greater risk of harm from 
bad or incompetent parenting than are non-adopted children. According to this line of 
thought, licensing prospective adoptive parents is important because it reduces this risk. 
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On the other hand, licensing other prospective parents, including people who have 
children via contract pregnancy, is unnecessary. The reason is that the children of these 
parents are at no greater risk of harm than children born to “fertile parents”, as Gamble 
puts it.  
Two explanations are typically given for why the risk of harm from bad parenting 
is greater in the case of adoption. One explanation is that the lack of a biological 
connection between parent and child in an adoption increases the possibility of harm to 
the child. A different explanation rests on the following two claims: that many adopted 
children have what we call, perhaps misleadingly, “special needs”, and that without 
ensuring that prospective adoptive parents have special training to meet these needs, the 
risk of bad parenting is heightened in this context. We focus on the first explanation in 
this section, and then turn our attention to the second explanation in the next section.  
Why would the lack of a biological connection between parent and child increase 
the likelihood of abuse or neglect in the parent-child relationship? For some, the answer 
to this question is obvious: parents who are not biologically related to their children—
through genetics or gestation—have no “natural affection” for them and so are more 
likely to harm them.29 In the past, we have given this view more attention than it 
probably deserves by indicating how little support it receives within the empirical 
literature on parental abuse and neglect (and also within literature on the effectiveness of 
parental licensing in reducing the risk for parental abuse or neglect by adoptive 
parents).30 Here, let us simply add that empirical studies on bonding between mothers 
and their young children shows that bonding is just as strong for adoptive mothers as it is 
for so-called “natural mothers”.31  
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Thus, an argument in favour of licensing adoptive parents that focuses on harm to 
children and a lack of biological relatedness is most likely empirically invalid. But more 
importantly for our purposes, even if a lack of biological relatedness increased the risk of 
harm to children from bad parenting, this fact could not show that licensing should 
always occur with adoption but should never occur with contract pregnancy. The reason, 
of course, is that some prospective parents who pursue contract pregnancy—namely 
those whose gametes are not used in this process—will themselves have no biological tie 
to any resulting child. According to the Harm to Children argument that focuses on 
biological relatedness (which we call the Harm to Children Argument I), these parents—
along with adoptive parents and other non-biological parents—should be subject to 
licensing.  
In short, the Harm to Children Argument I is weak in general, and is especially 
weak when applied to contract pregnancy, given that children created this way often have 
no biological tie, of any kind, to one parent. Consequently, the lack of a biological 
connection cannot constitute a moral difference sufficient to distinguish these parents 
from adoptive parents where parental vetting is at issue. The problem, again, is that in 
important respects, many individuals who seek to become parents through contract 
pregnancy are in the same boat, biologically speaking, as prospective adoptive parents. 
Thus, even if we accept the Harm to Children Argument I—despite how little empirical 
support there is for it—we should insist that many individuals who pursue contract 
pregnancy should be licensed.  
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We are not done with the Harm to Children Argument, however. For a different 
formulation of this argument exists, one that concerns neither biological relatedness nor 
biological reproduction, but the particular needs of particular children. We turn to it now.  
 
3. Arguments that Do Not Concern Biological Reproduction 
The previous arguments against licensing individuals who pursue contract pregnancy as a 
way to become a parent have focused on the reproductive aspects of this practice, and 
have sought to distinguish contract pregnancy from adoption on the grounds that while 
the former involves biological reproduction, the latter does not. In response to these 
arguments, we have claimed that the presence or absence of biological reproduction 
cannot establish that licensing individuals who seek to become parents through contract 
pregnancy is never justified. But there are also arguments against parental licensing for 
people who pursue contract pregnancy that do not focus on the reproductive element of 
this practice. Arguments of this sort include the version of the Harm to Children 
Argument that focuses on the needs of adopted children and what we call the Transfer of 
Responsibility Argument. 
 
 (i) The Harm to Children Argument II 
An alternative argument based on harm to children that supports licensing prospective 
adoptive parents but not people who wish to become parents through contract pregnancy 
focuses not on the lack of a biological tie but rather on the allegedly special needs of 
adopted children and the harm that parents can cause if they are not competent to meet 
these needs. Again, this argument draws a contrast between adopted children and 
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children created via contract pregnancy: the former have special needs while the latter do 
not. It is the presence of such needs, according to the argument, that justifies parental 
licensing in the case of adoptive parents. We will call this the Harm to Children 
Argument II.  
Before analyzing this argument, let us make three observations. First, if special 
needs are to do the work that the argument requires of them, then those needs must meet 
two conditions: (i) they must apply to many or all adopted children; and (ii) they must 
not apply to many or all children created through contract pregnancy. Otherwise, the 
argument will not be able to draw the necessary distinction between adoption and 
contract pregnancy.  
Second, among the special needs that could exist among many or all adopted 
children are the following32: needs that arise because of “adversity in early childhood”, 
such as abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other forms of deprivation or trauma33; and more 
controversially, the alleged need to know one’s genetic relatives. This second type of 
need is usually justified in terms of damage to the identity formation of the child: not 
knowing one’s genetic relatives supposedly means that one will not be able to answer 
“the pivotal question, ‘Who am I’?”34 The central claim in the Harm to Children 
Argument II is that adopted children often have one or both of these types of needs— 
needs that put them at risk of harm from bad parenting—whereas children who are 
conceived via contract pregnancy lack these special needs or, alternatively, are less likely 
to be put at risk of harm by bad parenting even if they have these needs. 
Third, as noted above, the term ‘special needs’ may be somewhat misleading.35 
This term is usually understood narrowly to include only those needs that are associated 
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with significant behavioural, physical, social, or emotional problems. But it could also be 
understood broadly to include any need that is unique or special to a particular individual 
or group of individuals. (Thus, the need that somebody with significant mobility issues 
has for a power wheelchair counts as a special need in the narrow sense, while a 
Muslim’s need for halal meat counts as a special need in the broad sense.) Here, we use 
both senses of the term ‘special needs’. For example, we, and others, invoke the narrow 
sense when referring to psychological and emotional needs among adopted children that 
arise because of adversity in early life. But we invoke the broad sense when 
characterizing the alleged need to know one’s genetic relatives as a “special need”. 
Children who possess the latter sort of need do not necessarily have behavourial or 
emotional problems. Still, the thought is that they may develop such problems if this 
need goes unmet; that is, they may acquire special needs in the narrow sense. Hence, 
regardless of whether one is talking about the need to know genetic relatives or needs 
associated with early adversity, claims about adopted children having these needs appeal 
to a narrow understanding of special needs. They suggest that these children have 
significant behavioural or emotional problems or are at serious risk of developing such 
problems (and these claims contribute, as a result, to the stigmatization of these children). 
We have chosen the language of “special needs” in part because it allows us to convey 
this fact.  
Let us return now to the argument that adopted children have special needs that 
children created by contract pregnancy lack, and that this alleged fact explains why 
adoptive parents, and adoptive parents alone, should be licensed. There are at least two 
ways to criticize this argument. First, one could challenge the claim that special needs 
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exist among adopted children but not among children created via contract pregnancy (if 
indeed adopted children are properly characterized as having special needs at all). And 
second, one could argue that the presence of special needs cannot be what explains why 
adoptive parents are subject to parental licensing. We pursue both strategies here.  
Let us begin with the claim that adopted children are unique in having special 
needs compared to children who are born via contract pregnancy. The first point to 
consider is whether adopted children do indeed have special needs. Many people would 
probably say that they do (i.e., have special needs in the narrow sense), on the grounds 
that these children tend to exhibit more behavioural or emotional problems than children 
who are not adopted. However, research on the psychological well-being of adopted 
children simply does not support this view. Instead, it shows that “[t]he vast majority of 
children who are adopted are well within the normal range of well-being and show 
behavioural patterns that are similar to their non-adopted peers”.36 Thus, assuming that 
non-adopted children are, on average, well adjusted psychologically, the same is true of 
adopted children.  
This research does not, however, rule out the possibility that many adopted 
children have special needs at the time of their adoption. Many of them may have special 
needs at that time, for example, because of adversity they have faced up to that point, 
needs that in most cases disappear sometime after they are adopted. Their immersion in a 
family that has been selected for them might counteract the effects of their early 
experiences. Indeed, a recent review of studies indicates that many children make a 
“remarkable recovery” from early adversity when they are adopted.37 In addition, even if 
adopted children always have a special need for some sort of connection to biological 
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family, this need could be met in most adoptions because of the relatively recent 
openness with adoption (i.e., openness to children knowing of or having contact with 
their birth family). In sum, although it is important to emphasize that the “vast majority” 
of adopted children do just fine, this fact may have more to do with the support they get 
from their adoptive families than with the absence of special needs among them before 
they are adopted.  
The second point we want to make is that to the extent that a need for information 
about genetic relatives is genuine, this need exists among many children who are born as 
a result of a contract pregnancy and is therefore not restricted to adopted children. When 
children are created through contract pregnancies that involve the use of donor gametes, 
they too are at risk of estrangement from their genetic relatives (a risk that is surely 
heightened with international contract pregnancy and among children who were created 
using both donor sperm and donor oocytes). This consideration counts against the 
following claims: (i) that prospective adoptive parents need to be vetted to ensure that 
they have the ability to parent children who will not be raised by their biological family, 
although the same is not true of parents of children created through contract pregnancy38; 
and (ii) that adopted children are alone in having special needs compared to children 
created through contract pregnancy.   
As noted above, the view that children have special needs as a result of not 
knowing their genetic relatives is controversial. This view raises a host of questions, not 
the least of which is how much information about genetic relatives is necessary in order 
to overcome or mitigate those special needs. Are basic autobiographical details 
enough?39 Is a whole life story necessary? Would the child have to have ongoing, face-
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to-face contact with biological relatives to form a healthy identity?40 The more 
information that one deems necessary, the less convincing one’s theory about identity 
formation will be, because it will contradict the empirical evidence about how well-
adjusted adopted children tend to be. For example, many of these well-adjusted children, 
including those in open adoptions, lack face-to-face contact with biological family, and 
surely most have only partial stories about who their genetic relatives are or were.41 
Adopted children could be unique after all in having special needs compared to 
children who are born through contract pregnancy if it turns out to be false that 
knowledge of one’s genetic relatives is important for one’s well-being. In that case, 
adopted children would likely be alone in having special needs associated with adversity 
in early life. On the other hand, it is important to consider whether children born through 
contract pregnancy might have special needs that adopted children lack. Some say that 
many of these children are at risk of being perceived and of perceiving themselves as 
products of the exploitation of poor and vulnerable women.42 Alternatively, they could be 
at risk of harm simply from knowing that a woman gestated and gave birth to them for 
money and then promptly gave them up. 
Thus, it is at best unclear whether parental licensing could be warranted for 
adoption but not for contract pregnancy on the grounds that adoption alone involves 
parenting children with special needs. We have spent considerable effort showing this 
much because—in our experience as adoptive parents—it is common for people to 
express the view that adopted children have special needs and are difficult to parent for 
this reason, while assuming the opposite about non-adopted children.   
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Let us turn now to the claim that the presence of special needs explains why 
adoptive parents are subject to parental licensing in the first place. This proposition is 
doubtful simply because many children who are raised by their biological parents 
themselves have special needs (i.e., those associated with significant behavioural, 
emotional or other problems) and yet their parents are not subject to licensing. Thus, in 
our view, a concern about meeting special needs could not be what motivates the current 
system of licensing.43 The Harm to Children Argument II therefore fails to justify the 
claim that there should be licensing for adoption but not for contract pregnancy. Let us 
now evaluate one final argument in favour of this position.  
 
(ii) The Transfer of Responsibility Argument 
A different argument in support of licensing for prospective parents who pursue 
adoption, but not for those who choose contract pregnancy, focuses on parental 
responsibility. The argument rests on two distinct claims: first, that there is a 
fundamental difference between the way in which parental responsibility is acquired in 
the case of adoption, compared to contract pregnancy and other forms of reproduction; 
and second, that this difference implies that only adoptive parents should be subject to 
parental licensing. The animating idea, in brief, is this. Before an adoption occurs there 
exists a child for whom someone—the state or an actual person—is responsible. During 
an adoption, this responsibility is transferred to someone else, namely the child’s 
adoptive parent(s). The reason why parental licensing is required in the case of adoption 
is to ensure that this transfer occurs in a morally serious manner, something that can 
happen only if the party or parties relinquishing responsibility for the child can 
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reasonably expect that the child’s future will be good (or at least good enough). 
Licensing provides such assurance to the child’s pre-adoptive guardians and is justified 
for this reason. We call this the Transfer of Responsibility argument.44 
Although this argument is deployed primarily to support the status quo on 
parental licensing, it can also be used to argue that no licensing should occur specifically 
in the context of contract pregnancy. Such reasoning would proceed as follows. Prior to 
the formation of a pregnancy contract there is no child for whom someone is responsible. 
Indeed, only after the contract has been performed does a child exist. Consequently, the 
idea that there is a transfer of responsibility for a child with contract pregnancy must be 
rejected, and with it the idea that there should be licensing for people who pursue this 
practice.  
To respond, we think that the Transfer of Responsibility Argument is invalid: the 
presence or absence of a transfer of responsibility for a child cannot be what justifies the 
status quo on parental licensing, nor can it support the claim that licensing should never 
occur in the context of contract pregnancy.45 We hold his view for the following reason: 
if transfers of parental responsibility demand a level of moral seriousness that justifies a 
parental licensing requirement, then surely acquisitions of parental responsibility ought 
to be treated in a similarly serious manner. But given that in a contract pregnancy, the 
commissioning couple clearly acquires parental responsibility for a child (i.e., the child 
who is gestated by the contract pregnant woman), it stands to reason that such individuals 
should be licensed if the normative principle underlying the Transfer of Responsibility 
Argument—the principle about moral seriousness—is true. In short, if we accept this 
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principle, and regardless of whether contract pregnancy involves a transfer of parental 
responsibility, we should agree that there should be parental licensing in this context. 
But let us focus here not on the validity (or structure) of the Transfer of 
Responsibility Argument, but rather on what it suggests about contract pregnancy: 
namely, that this practice involves no transfer of responsibility. We reject this claim. 
Indeed, we contend that a transfer of responsibility does occur with contract pregnancy: 
the contract pregnant woman transfers some responsibility for the child to whom she 
gives birth to the commissioning couple.46 Thus, again, if one agrees that licensing 
adoptive parents is justified because it ensures that responsibility for a child is transferred 
properly, then one ought to accept that the prospective parents of any child created 
through contract pregnancy should be licensed.  
Two aspects of this issue deserve further comment, however. The first concerns 
an apparent asymmetry between adoption and contract pregnancy that would justify the 
imposition of a licensing requirement on adoptive parents alone. The second concerns the 
role of the state in imposing this requirement. Turning to the first point, notice that in 
discussing adoption, we used the term ‘parental responsibility.’ And one might object 
that in cases of contract pregnancy, this is precisely what is missing: the contract 
pregnant woman, whatever else her relation to the child she gestates, is not the child’s 
parent; she is (merely) a “gestator.” Thus, even if something is transferred from her to the 
child’s intentional parents, it is not parental responsibility that is transferred, and the 
analogy breaks down. 
To respond to this argument, it is worth stating to begin with that parental 
responsibility might be precisely what is transferred in such cases. Given the murkiness 
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of the moral waters here, it is difficult to conclude that the contract pregnant woman is 
not a parent to the child she gestates and therefore could not transfer parental 
responsibility for this child to the commissioning couple. Gestation could ground 
parenthood47; and if it does so, then a child that a woman gestates for others is partly her 
child, regardless of whether she is genetically related to the child.  
But set this issue about gestation and parenthood aside. The more important 
consideration, in our view, is the following. Even if the responsibility the contract 
pregnant woman has toward the future child she gestates is not properly characterized as 
parental, she nevertheless has at least some care-taking responsibility for this child 
during the pregnancy, a responsibility that she transfers to other people once the child is 
born. Broadly speaking, her responsibility extends to the physical well-being of the 
future child (e.g., to its nourishment and physical safety), while the commissioning 
couple has responsibility throughout for other aspects of the child’s well-being (including 
those that concern the child’s future well-being, such as where s/he will live, how s/he 
will be educated, etc.). In addition, if nothing else, the contract pregnant woman’s 
responsibility should give rise to an interest in her to ensure that the individuals who will 
parent the child she gestates will love and care for that child. Assuming all of that is true, 
in the context of contract pregnancy, there is a transfer of responsibility—more 
specifically, for a future child’s physical well-being—and the person from whom the 
responsibility is transferred has an interest in knowing that this child’s prospective 
parents will be good ones. It follows, according to the Transfer of Responsibility 
Argument, that there should be parental licensing in this context.  
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One could still offer the following counter-response, however: rather than being 
transferred between the different parties, the responsibility of the contract pregnant 
woman might simply be delegated to her by the commissioning couple when she 
conceives and gestates “their child”. And if that were true, then the commissioning 
couple would retain all responsibility for the future child during the pregnancy, while 
having the pregnant woman carry out some of this responsibility. In short, according to 
this counter-response, because no responsibility of any kind is transferred from the 
commissioning couple to the contract pregnant woman—responsibility is merely 
delegated—it follows from the Transfer of Responsibility Argument that parental 
licensing for commissioning couples is unjustified.48  
We reject the above characterization, however, because we believe that the only 
person who could, or should, have ultimate responsibility for the physical well-being of a 
future child in pregnancy is the pregnant woman herself. The reason is that others could 
only exercise this responsibility by confining or controlling the pregnant woman to a 
degree that would violate her autonomy or undermine her dignity. To illustrate, compare 
the relationship between the contract pregnant woman and the commissioning couple to 
the relationship between a set of parents and a babysitter who agrees to care for their 
child for an evening (or a weekend, or a week). If the parents were to learn that the 
babysitter was ignoring his duties, or was performing those duties in a negligent fashion, 
they could remedy the situation by removing the child from the babysitter’s care, 
terminating the agreement, and sending the babysitter home. Ultimate responsibility for 
the child would remain with the parents throughout.  
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But the case of a contract pregnant woman seems very different. To see why, 
suppose the following: that the commissioning couple does retain ultimate responsibility 
for the future child’s physical well-being and merely delegates this responsibility to the 
contract pregnant woman in accordance with the terms of the pregnancy contract; that the 
commissioning couple learns that the contract pregnant woman is not meeting the terms 
of the contract—because, for example, she is eating poorly; and that she cannot be 
persuaded to do otherwise. In such a situation, it seems that the only recourse available to 
the commissioning couple would be to limit the freedom of the contract pregnant woman 
severely, and in the case of her not eating properly, to coerce her to eat or even force-
feed her. But such action, it seems to us, fails to respect her autonomy and dignity. If, in 
other words, the commissioning couple did retain ultimate responsibility for the future 
child’s physical well-being, then they would be permitted—indeed obligated—to do the 
impermissible. And this suggests that in order for the pregnancy contract to be valid, the 
contract pregnant woman must have ultimate responsibility for the physical well-being of 
the future child for the duration of the contract. The commissioning couple cannot have 
this responsibility—which is not to say that they could not be parents to the child, given 
that it is possible to be a parent without having or exercising parental responsibility (as is 
the case for parents who have lost custody of their child). 
To be clear, the argument here is not that all pregnancy contracts are morally 
suspect because they inevitably compromise the dignity or autonomy of the contract 
pregnant woman. To the contrary, we accept that in the absence of coercion or 
exploitation a woman could freely enter into a valid pregnancy contract. Rather, the 
argument is that a pregnancy contract could be valid only if the contract pregnant woman 
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assumes some ultimate responsibility for the future child, responsibility that she 
subsequently transfers to the commissioning couple. 
A second aspect of the Transfer of Responsibility Argument concerns the role of 
the state and the reasons it has for imposing a licensing requirement on prospective 
parents. In the case of adoptions, the state is clearly involved in the process by which 
responsibility for the child is transferred from one party to another. The state may 
actively assume responsibility for the child and then transfer that responsibility to 
somebody else, as is the case with public domestic adoptions; or the state may oversee 
the transfer of the child from one responsible party to another and approve it by issuing 
various legal documents, such as visas or citizenship certificates in the case of 
international adoptions. In other words, it may be the state’s involvement in the transfer 
of responsibility that justifies it in imposing a licensing requirement on prospective 
adoptive parents. If, however, the state has no involvement in overseeing contract 
pregnancies, then an important difference may exist between any obligations it incurs in 
connection with contract pregnancy and its obligations with respect to adoption.  
We would resist this argument, however, on the grounds that the state is involved 
in the transfer of the care of a child who is created through contract pregnancy, especially 
in the international variety of this practice. Through the operation of its legal 
mechanisms, the state grants parental rights to the commissioning couple and, in the case 
of international contract pregnancy, statehood to the child.49 Because such actions are 
normatively significant, both for the child and for the child’s parents, they ought to occur 
in a morally serious manner, which is precisely what parental vetting seeks to ensure 
according to the Transfer of Responsibility Argument.  
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In short, it is hard to see a moral difference between adoption and contract 
pregnancy when it comes to the transfer of responsibility for a child. In both cases, there 
is an individual who has some, if not all, responsibility for the well-being of a child, and 
who relinquishes this responsibility to somebody else who assumes parental 
responsibility for him or her. And in both cases, the state is involved in this transfer of 
responsibility. Consequently, if parental licensing is justified in the case of adoption on 
the grounds outlined in the Transfer of Responsibility Argument, then it must be justified 
in the case of contract pregnancy as well. The same considerations apply to both 
practices.  
Many people find the Transfer of Responsibility Argument compelling.50 But to 
reiterate, we are not among them. In our view, the moral principle underlying this 
argument is not a narrow principle involving transfers of responsibility, but rather the 
broader principle that acquisitions of parental responsibility must be undertaken in a 
morally serious manner. Thus, even if our remarks concerning transfers of responsibility 
in the context of contract pregnancy are misguided, the Transfer of Responsibility 
Argument would still fail to block a parental vetting requirement for individuals who 
seek to become parents through contract pregnancy.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
To conclude, we have presented what we take to be the best arguments one could give 
for why a parental licensing requirement should be absent from a Hague convention on 
international contract pregnancy, despite the fact that such a requirement appears in the 
Convention on Adoption. Moreover, we take ourselves to have shown that none of these 
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arguments succeeds. While our analysis of many of them indicates that all prospective 
parents in contract pregnancy arrangements should be subject to some sort of licensing 
requirement so long as prospective adoptive parents are subject to the same, our 
assessment here of some of these arguments, however—in particular, the Right to 
Reproduce Argument—showed only that prospective parents who do not reproduce 
through contract pregnancy should have to undergo licensing. A (so-called) right to 
reproduce could protect any other prospective parents from having to do the same. Thus, 
we have proven only the weak claim that some individuals who pursue contract 
pregnancy should be licensed, again so long as adoptive parents are licensed. Our general 
conclusion with respect to the Hague Conference is therefore as follows: to be ethically 
consistent with the Convention on Adoption, any convention on international contract 
pregnancy should include an article that requires the receiving country to determine that 
at least some of the prospective parents of children born through contract pregnancy will 
most likely fulfill these children’s needs. 
 Notice, however, that the weak claim that some individuals who pursue contract 
pregnancy should be licensed may bleed into the stronger claim that all or most of these 
individuals should be licensed. Once one endorses the first claim, in other words, one 
may have to accept the second as well. Whether that is true may depend, moreover, on 
how one understands parental licensing. For example, if one has in mind a traditional 
home study—which involves an intimate look at one’s household, financial status, 
relationships with others, etcetera—then it may simply be impractical to license one 
prospective parent (i.e., the one who will not be genetically related to any resulting 
child), but not the other. In that case, one should license both (or neither, although in 
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licensing neither, one may show insufficient concern for children’s well-being51). But if 
one thinks that licensing should simply involve a mandatory parenting course for 
example, then one member of a couple could probably be licensed on his or her own. In 
short, considerations about what is feasible and about what form parental licensing 
should take will shape what the Hague Conference could do around parental licensing for 
contract pregnancy. We have not discussed these matters here, but rather have shown 
simply that there are no good moral reasons (as opposed to purely practical reasons) for 
excluding a licensing requirement from a Hague convention on contract pregnancy while 
maintaining the current requirement in the Hague Convention on Adoption. Ethical 
consistency demands that the former convention impose some kind of licensing on some 
prospective parents who pursue international contract pregnancy.  
Lastly, there must be other ways in which the two conventions would have to 
resemble one another in order to be ethically consistent with one another, and we discuss 
some of these elsewhere.52 In this paper, we have focused only on the issue of parental 
licensing. Beyond what it recommends on this subject, however, this paper has 
implications for the larger project of ensuring that no ethical inconsistencies exist 
between the two documents. Our discussion reveals that one commonly cited difference 
between contract pregnancy and adoption—that the one involves biological reproduction 
while the other does not—is less significant than many commentators assume it is.53 
Even though biological reproduction occurs with contract pregnancy, the parents of 
children born in this way do not necessarily have a genetic tie to them, did not give birth 
to them, and in arranging to have those children conceived, do not always exercise a (so-
called) right to reproduce. In other words, the situation of many of these parents is in 
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many respects indistinguishable from that of adoptive parents. Thus, it would be difficult 
for the Hague Conference to justify the unequal treatment of these two groups of parents 
on the grounds that adoption, unlike contract pregnancy, does not involve biological 
reproduction.  
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concern the desire to have a genetically related child that oneself or one’s partner gives 
birth to.   
26 On whether the science of genetics supports the view that family resemblances are 
primarily genetic, see Levy and Lotz, op. cit. note 25, pp. 237-8. They explain that 
people tend grossly to exaggerate the role that genetic factors, as opposed to social 
factors, play in determining who we are or who our genetic children will or would be.  
27 One could understand the right more broadly to include not only the right to have 
genetic children but also the right to gestate those children. However, as implied above, 
this broader understanding of the right is not relevant to people who pursue contract 
pregnancy as a way of having children.  
28 To be fair, these reasons in support of a right to reproduce are not exhaustive. For 
example, some cite religious reasons in support of the claim that some individuals have a 
right to reproduce. By way of illustration, consider the following passage from the King 
James Bible: ‘And you, be ye fruitful, and multiply; bring forth abundantly in the earth, 
and multiply therein.’ (Genesis 9:7) Here, God is not commanding Noah and his sons to 
create families, but is rather commanding them to reproduce and repopulate the earth. It 
is therefore difficult to see how adoption could satisfy God’s admonition to the faithful to 
multiply fruitfully and bring forth abundantly. Alternatively, members of groups that 
have been subject to eugenics programs or to genocide might themselves assert a right to 
reproduce that is distinct from a right to become a parent. So, for example, individuals 
whose extended family perished in the Holocaust, or were killed in the Rwandan 
genocide, might insist that they have a right to reproduce, because only by reproducing 
can the wrongs that have been done to them and to their family be mitigated. For some 
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discussion of these issues, see McLeod and Botterell op. cit. note 2 and Karey Harwood, 
‘Bad Habit or Considered Decision? The need for a closer examination of prospective 
parents’ views’, International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 7, 1 (2014): 
46-50. For objections to the claim that religious reasons can justify a preference for 
reproduction over adoption, see Christine Overall, op. cit. note 24, p. 21.  
29 See LaFollette 1980, p. 195. He mentions this view but not endorse it.  
30 See McLeod and Botterell op. cit. note 2, pp. 156-157.   
31 See L.M. Singer et al., ‘Mother-infant attachment in adoptive families’, Child 
Development, 56, 6 (1985): 1543-1551; J.E. Koepke et al., ‘Becoming Parents: Feelings 
of Adoptive Mothers’, Pediatric Nursing, 17, 4 (1991): 333-336; and Judith Daniluk and 
Joss Hurtig-Mitchell, ‘Themes of Hope and Healing: Infertile Couples’ Experiences of 
Adoption’, Journal of Counseling and Development, 81, 4 (2003): 389-399. Thanks to 
Tina Rulli for directing us to this literature.   
32 Excluded, for example, are needs associated with physical or psychological infirmities 
that have been present since birth.  
33 See Lucy Blake et al., ‘The Families of Assisted Reproduction and Adoption’, in F. 
Baylis and C. McLeod (eds.) Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 75. 
34 Françoise Baylis, ‘Transnational Commercial Contract Pregnancy in India’ in F. Baylis 
and C. McLeod (eds.) Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 277. See also David Velleman, ‘Family History’, 
Philosophical Papers, 34, 3 (2005): 357-378. Here, we interpret a right to know one’s 
genetic relatives as being more robust than a right simply to know one’s medical history. 
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Children who have non-biological parents may indeed have the latter right, while lacking 
the former right.  
35 Thanks to Françoise Baylis for raising this point in conversation with us.  
36 Blake et al. op. cit. note 33, p. 76, citing Ann Brand and Paul Brinich, ‘Behaviour 
Problems and Mental Health Contacts in Adopted, Foster, and Nonadopted Children’, 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 8 (1999): 1221-1229. (Note that Brand 
and Brinich’s study did take into account the age of placement of adopted children and 
concluded that it is not a strong predictor of behavioural or emotional problems in these 
children.) See also L.D. Borders et al., ‘Are Adopted Children and Their Parents at 
Greater Risk of Negative Outcomes?’ Family Relations, 47, 3 (1998): 237-241, cited in 
Sally Haslanger ‘Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Significant of Biological 
Ties?’ Adoption and Culture, 2, 1 (2009): 91-122. 
37 See Blake et al ibid., citing Jésus Palacios and Evan Donaldson, ‘Review: Adoption 
Research: Trends, Topics, Outcomes’, International Journal of Behavioral Development, 
34, 3 (2010): 270-284. See also Marinus van Ijzendoorn and Femmie Juffer, ‘The 
Emanuel Miller Memorial Lecture 2006: Adoption as Intervention. Meta-analytic 
evidence for massive catch-up and plasticity in physical, socio-emotional, and cognitive 
development’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 47, 12 (2006): 1228-45. 
38 These parents would have to be vetted as well, as would any parents of donor-
conceived children, single mothers who have no relationship with their child’s biological 
father, etcetera. 
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39 Notice that if such details are enough, then there is no reason to think they could not 
be available to children born through gestational contract pregnancy, even of the 
international variety.  
40 This appears to be David Velleman’s view; see Velleman op. cit. note 34.   
41 One might think that evidence about the psychological well-being of donor-conceived 
children would be useful here; but unfortunately, the evidence is inconclusive: see Baylis 
op. cit. note 34, p. 277. To be sure, there are many reports in the media and elsewhere of 
donor-conceived people experiencing psychological distress because of missing 
information about genetic relatives. However, it is simply not known how common this 
problem is, or will be, among donor-conceived people. It also highly doubtful whether, in 
our bionormative society, the media would ever give as much attention to “counter-
stories”—that is, stories told by people who feel no need to know about their genetic 
relatives—as it does to stories of identity struggle; see again Baylis ibid., p. 278. 
Dominant society may simply not be interested in hearing about the donor-conceived or 
adopted child who feels no need for a connection to biological family.  
42 Baylis ibid. She claims that this is true for children born to Indian women in 
international contract pregnancies. She also explains that India is currently the 
“destination of choice” for people who want to become parents through this practice. On 
the bad social circumstances of Indian contract pregnant women, see Amrita Pande’s 
‘Not an ‘Angel’, Not a ‘Whore’: Surrogates as ‘Dirty’ Workers in India’, Indian Journal 
of Gender Studies 16, 2 (2009): 150-154 (cited in Vita Panitch’s ‘Surrogate Tourism and 
Reproductive Rights’, Hypatia 28, 2 (2013): 274-289).  
43 McLeod and Botterell op. cit. note 2, p. 158.  
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44 Ibid., pp. 160-164. 
45 Ibid., pp. 161-162.  
46 As an anonymous reviewer suggested, one might think that transfers of parental 
responsibility are importantly different with adoptions, because they do not occur directly 
between birth parents and adoptive parents. Rather, the state takes responsibility for the 
child from the birth parents and then transfers it to the adoptive parents. Moreover, given 
this role, the state is justified in licensing adoptive parents. To respond, it is enough to 
point out that this is not how it works with all adoptions; in particular, the state does not 
take the child into its custody with a private adoption.  
47 On the grounds of parenthood, see Tim Bayne and Avery Kolers, ‘Parenthood and 
Procreation’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/parenthood/.  
48 On the transferring and delegating of responsibility, see Reuven Brandt’s ‘Moral 
Responsibility in Sperm and Ova Donation’ (PhD Dissertation, Western University, 
defended January 2015).  
49 Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, op. cit. note 6.  
50 We have found that to be true among audiences of our work. For example, one 
audience member has been Christine Overall, who, in a recent paper, uses a version of 
the Transfer of Responsibility Argument to support parental licensing for people who 
wish to become parents through contract pregnancy. See her ‘Reproductive ‘Surrogacy’ 
and Parental Licensing,’ Bioethics, 29, 5 (2015): 353-361.  
51 In addition, if one chooses to license neither prospective parent where only one of 
them will be genetically related to any resulting child, then one would still be left with 
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having to license both parents in cases where neither of them will have this genetic 
connection.  
52 Carolyn McLeod and Andrew Botterell, ‘A Hague Convention on Contract Pregnancy 
(or ‘Surrogacy’): Avoiding Ethical Inconsistencies with the Convention on Adoption’, 
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 7, 2 (2014): 219-235.  
53 This is not to say that this difference lacks moral significance. To the contrary, it is in 
our opinion of great moral significance that with contract pregnancy, people go to great 
lengths to create children when many children in the world need parents.  
